Enforcer From Death Row (1976) \/\/FREE\\\\

An international peace keeping agency rescues a former Army Ranger from execution and sends him on a mission to bust up a dangerous spy ring.[8][9] T.L. Young (played by Leo Fong) is sent to the gas chamber and his death there is faked. He is offered $100,000 to stop the dangerous spy ring that has got hold of a deadly chemical weapon.[10]

Enforcer from Death Row (1976)

In Robeson County, North Carolina, Joe Britt obtained 38 death sentences from 1974 to 1988. Courts later determined that Britt had engaged in misconduct in 14 of those cases, and two defendants were eventually exonerated.

Sedley Alley was convicted and sentenced to death in 1987 for the rape and murder of Lance Cpl. Suzanne Collins near the barracks of the Naval Air Station in Millington, Tennessee. The lawyers appointed to represent him at trial failed to investigate glaring inconsistencies between the physical evidence and a confession Alley consistently said had been coerced. Instead, with no prior history of mental illness, they argued that he suffered from a multiple-personality disorder and was not guilty by reason of insanity.

Texas executed Lester Bower on June 3, 2015, after he had spent more than 30 years on death row. Bower unsuccessfully challenged his conviction and sentence on numerous grounds, including that prosecutors had withheld evidence from the defense supporting his innocence claim.

Ray was convicted in July 1999 of the alleged rape, robbery, and murder of 15-year-old Tiffany Harville in Selma, Alabama. No physical evidence linked Ray to the murder, and the only evidence that Harville had been raped and robbed came from a severely mentally ill man, Marcus Owden, who confessed to the crime and avoided the death penalty by implicating Ray. Owden was also the only person who placed Ray in Selma at the time of the murder.

2. Wilson claims that his rights to freedom of speech and freedom of association were violated during the penalty phase of his trial by the introduction of evidence showing his involvement with the Folks gang.[2] In support of his contention, Wilson relies upon Dawson v. Delaware, 503 U.S. 159, 112 S. Ct. 1093, 117 L. Ed. 2d 309 (1992), wherein the U.S. Supreme Court held that a defendant's association with a racist organization was protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments and that evidence of such an association could not lawfully be introduced unless relevant to the issues to be tried. Presentation by the State of evidence that proves "nothing more than [a defendant's] abstract beliefs[ ]" (id. at 167, 112 S.Ct. 1093) invites punishment of a criminal defendant's exercise of constitutionally protected rights. In the present case, however, evidence of Wilson's involvement with the Folks gang and of the violent nature of that gang was relevant to the issues to be decided by the jury during the sentencing phase of his trial. The State presented testimony that the Folks gang required its members to commit violent, criminal acts and that Wilson held a powerful position in the gang. The State also presented a tape-recorded statement of Wilson claiming to be the gang's "chief enforcer," Wilson's handwritten notebooks regarding the gang, and a photograph found in Wilson's residence of a young man displaying a gang hand sign. Because the evidence in question was not objected to at trial, Wilson is barred from challenging its introduction on appeal. Earnest v. State, 262 Ga. 494(1), 422 S.E.2d 188 (1992).

I concur in the majority's affirmance of appellant's adjudication of guilt. However, regarding appellant's death sentence, the majority implicitly concludes that no Eighth Amendment concerns are raised by the sentence of death by electrocution.[5] This conclusion, however, is reached without the benefit of forthcoming guidance from the United States Supreme Court on that issue, and without an analysis of the voluminous evidence that is available regarding the constitutional implications of electrocution. For the first time in its history, the United States Supreme Court is poised to make a determination of whether there is evidence to show that a particular method of executionelectrocutionviolates the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. Because I believe prudence requires this Court to stay its Eighth Amendment rulings in capital cases until we receive guidance from the United States Supreme Court in the coming months, I respectfully dissent to the affirmance of appellant's death sentence.

Nor has Georgia's Supreme Court ever undertaken its own analysis of whether there is objective evidence to show that death in the State's electric chair constitutes cruel and unusual punishment, as that phrase is constitutionally understood.[9] Rather, this Court has habitually disposed of such claims perfunctorily, without considering whether a growing body of evidence indicates that electrocution causes a lingering death and undue violence, torture, and mutilation.[10] I believe that it is time for this Court to cease its cursory review of Eighth Amendment claims in capital cases, and to confront head-on the issue of whether there is evidence to show that execution by electrocution is unconstitutionally cruel and unusual. To my mind, the logical and prudent first step in that process is to await pending word from the nation's highest court regarding that very issue.[11]

When Allen Lee Davis was executed in Florida's electric chair in July 1999, a leather strap was secured across his mouth and part of his nostrils, and a heavy fabric face mask was placed over his head. Blood poured from his nose before and during the electrocution, and several witnesses reported hearing two screams from Davis when the current was applied. By the time the execution was completed, a blood pool "the size of a dinner plate" covered the front of Davis's shirt. It was later determined that Davis's death was caused in part by asphyxiation caused by the leather face strap. As with Medina, Davis's head, face, and scalp were severely burned, as were his knees and thighs. Provenzano, supra at 432-435.

Following Dr. Johnson's appointment, she and special counsel sought authorization for contact visits with Mr. Comer to facilitate and expedite completion of their respective tasks. On March 14, 2001, the Court entered a stipulated order lodged by Respondents granting the request. (Dkt. 180; R.T. 3/14/01 at 5-9.) Thereafter, several contact visits with Mr. Comer occurred without incident. On April 30, 2001, with the knowledge of, and without objection from Respondents, special counsel asked, and received, an order permitting them to forego wearing protective gear ordinarily required of anyone within physical proximity of a death row inmate. (Dkt. 197; R.T. 4/30/01 at 31-32.)

The Court has been cognizant from the outset of the solemnity of the decision before it. First, there is the obvious death is a one-way street but the Court is also aware that its findings of fact and credibility decisions will be accorded significant deference. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 52(a); Mason v. Vasquez, 5 F.3d 1220, 1224-25 (9th Cir.1993). These realities have led the Court to anguish over its decision and ultimately over the question of whether any healthy person, choosing between being and not being, could ever freely choose the terrifying ignorance of what may follow death, over enduring the ordeal of life.[22]

Although the Ninth Circuit expressly disavowed any intention that this Court assess whether the conditions of confinement on Arizona's death row, i.e., in SMU II, violate the Eighth Amendment, it directed this Court to assess whether Mr. Comer's conditions of confinement have rendered his decision to waive further review involuntary. In addition, the conditions of his confinement in the California Department of Corrections ("CDC") figure in the experts' evaluations regarding whether Mr. Comer suffers from a mental disorder. Therefore, an overview of those conditions is included below.

In 1996, Mr. Comer and Mr. Vickers were moved to SMU II. (Id.) In 1997, most of Arizona's other death row inmates were moved from CB6 to SMU II. (R.T. 3/26/02 at 54.) Mr. Comer remains confined to SMU II. He remained close friends with Mr. Vickers until Mr. Vickers's execution on May 5, 1999.

For purposes of this action, the physical layout of SMU I and SMU II do not materially differ. (See R.T. 3/26/02 at 58.) SMU I is a few years older than SMU II. (Id.) Both units consist of two levels of cells which extend like spokes from an elevated central control booth. (Id.) At the end of each spoke, or pod, is an outdoor recreation area measuring twelve feet by twenty feet with high concrete walls and floors and cyclone fencing over the top. (Id. at 59.) At times relevant to this matter, Mr. Comer has been held in a single cell measuring seven feet by eleven feet. (Id. at 59.) His cell door is covered with a translucent material called Lexan, which prevents materials from being thrown out of, or into, his cell.[38] His cells in SMU I and II have been equipped with a bunk, toilet, sink, desk and stool constructed of metal secured to the concrete walls and floors of the cell. (Id.) As noted above, Mr. Comer's cell was modified during the summer of 2001 to remove the desk and stool and to reinforce the bunk to make it more difficult for Mr. Comer to fashion weapons. (Id.) Mr. Comer receives between an hour and an hour and a half of individual recreation three times a week. (R.T. 3/27/02 at 516, 540.) He also has the opportunity to shower three times a week. (R.T. 3/26/02 at 64; R.T. 3/27/02 at 455, 516.) In addition, Mr. Comer has access to cleaning materials. Pursuant to ADOC policy, he and other death row inmates are not permitted "contact" visits absent court order, but he is permitted non-contact visits.

Since Rees was decided, courts have repeatedly applied its direction to evaluate a capital inmate's competency to waive review, but found that condemned inmates who are mentally competent may nevertheless rationally decide to waive legal review of their sentences. See Gilmore v. Utah, 429 U.S. 1012, 97 S. Ct. 436, 50 L. Ed. 2d 632 (1976); Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 165, 110 S. Ct. 1717, 109 L. Ed. 2d 135 (1990) ("next friend" standing is not available if "an evidentiary hearing shows that the defendant has given a knowing, intelligent and voluntary waiver of his right to proceed, and his access to court is otherwise unimpeded"); see also Brewer v. Lewis, 989 F.2d 1021, 1027 (9th Cir.1993); Lenhard v. Wolff, 603 F.2d 91, 93 (9th Cir.1979). In Smith v. Armontrout, 812 F.2d 1050, 1056 (8th Cir.1987), the Eighth Circuit rejected the contention that Rees barred waiver of post-conviction review in capital cases based on the mere possibility that the inmate's decision was the product of a mental disease, disorder or defect, citing Rumbaugh v. Procunier, 753 F.2d 395, 398-99 (5th Cir.1985), and Hays v. Murphy, 663 F.2d 1004 (10th Cir. 1981). The court determined that a literal interpretation of the portion of the Rees standard asking whether an inmate suffered from "`a mental disease, disorder, or defect which may substantially affect his capacity,' would conflict with a similarly literal interpretation of the other half of the test, which asks whether the prisoner has, rather than absolutely, certainly, or undoubtedly has, the capacity to appreciate his position and make a rational choice." Smith, 812 F.2d at 1057. The court noted that: 041b061a72